Abstract. This paper estimates the position of China's manufacturing in the global value chains (GVCs) in 1995-2011 by using GVC position index and participation index. Results show that China's manufacturing has been deeply inserted into, while locate mainly on the low end of, global value chains. Supply-side reforms led by government may change this situation.
Introduction
Over the past three decades and particularly since the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001, the world has witnessed a surprisingly fast growth of China's economy. Thanks to the strong performance in its foreign trade sector, Chinese manufacturing industry contributed to nearly 40% of its GDP in 2014, with averagely a slightly over two digit annual growth rate during the last decade. In term of export, China's manufacturing goods have surpassed that of the United States with a value of over 2200 billion US dollars in 2014, only following the Europe Union as a whole.
The massive and rapid contraction of global trade and output during the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 reflects the facts that the world manufacturing industries have been deeply involved in the global value chains (GVC), the process of ever-finer specialization and geographic fragmentation of production, with the more labor-intensive parts of the production process transferred to developing countries (Cattaneo and Gereffi et al., 2010) .
Due to the increasing worries held by the governments, especially those of western developed industrial countries, over the weakening capabilities in innovation in recent years, which is believed resulting from the long-held strategy of "de-industrialization" and over-reliance on the GVCs, advanced industrial countries are pushing strategies on "re-industrialization". The Obama administration enacted and legitimized the "US Manufacturing Enhancement Act" in 2010, intended to support US manufacturing. In 2012 US government released "A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing" in order to promote capabilities in innovation for manufacturing. In the same vein, the government of Germany launched "The High-Tech Strategy for Germany" since 2006 to improve the policy environment for technology innovation. Nowadays it has a great interest in applying "industries 4.0", which focuses the digitisation of the economy. India is also working on its plan for promoting manufacturing by implementing the "Made in India" strategy.
The fiercer competing for lead in future manufacturing among nations, however, may offer a better chance for China's manufacturing to joining in GVCs and upgrading. Although there is a sharp debate about China's capabilities in Hi-tech industries (Michael, 2012), China has long been acclaimed as "world factory" because of its unrivaled capabilities on volume production, though its manufacturing and export prowess is evident in the light and consumer goods industries (Dallas, 2014) . Nonetheless, "Made-in-China 2025" plan launched in March, 2015 by Chinese government shows the eagerness for China to boost the manufacturing and shift its current profit-meager positions in GVCs to higher value-added segments of manufacturing and services.
In this paper we seek to explore the role, and analyze the position, of China's manufacturing in GVCs during recent decades. This paper is organized as follows. A review of literature on related theories and discoveries on GVCs is briefly presented as background in section 2, then the methods and data applied in this paper are discussed in order to justify the analysis hereafter followed. A detailed analysis on results will be presented, then follow the conclusions.
Literature Review
The theory of Global Value Chains was formally introduced in 1999, intending to examine the different ways in which global production and distribution systems are integrated (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi and Humphrey et al., 2005) . It was an extension of notion "value-added chain", which is "the process by which technology is combined with material and labor inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, marketed, and distributed. A single firm may consist of only one link in this process, or it may be extensively vertically integrated." (Kogut, 1985) , in term of across a country border. Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) use the term 'fragmentation' to describe the physical separation of different parts of a production process in the international dimension. Regarding how to coordinate these geographically dispersed and fragmented activities, Prof. Gereffi proposed two types of coordination, i.e., "buyer-driven chains" and "producer-driven chains" (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994) , and later he adjusted his views by adding three distinct network types, i.e., market, modular value chains, relational value chains, captive value chains, and hierachy (Gereffi and Humphrey et al., 2005) . The discoveries on the governance of GVCs are echoed by some Chinese researchers' works (Hui, 2004; Hui, 2006; Chunying and Minghua, 2015) .
Due to the increasingly import role played by China's manufacturing in global markets, more and more researching interests are drawn from academic and practitioner fields, primarily through case studies. In a classical study on production of iPods, which are assembled in China from several hundred components and parts that are sourced from around the world, Apple, a US-based company, is estimated to capture up to one half of an iPod retail price. Asian firms like Toshiba from Japan and Samsung from South Korea capture another major part as profits from manufacturing high-value components, such as hard-disk drive, display and memory. In contrast, Chinese workers can only capture no more than two percent by performing assembling and testing activities (Dedrick and Kraemer L. et al., 2008). Aliyrkko and Rouvinen (Aliyrkko and Rouvinen, 2015) discussed the case of Nokia N95 smartphone. It revealed that, though the whole production processes of N95 are deployed in China, EU countries can still capture 51% of total value added. Those case studies on GVCs have provided detailed examples of the discrepancy between a country's gross and value-added trade.
Other researchers tried to estimate the positions and the extent to which an industry involves in GVCs (Hummels and Ishii More recent researchers have found evidence that there exist complexities and heterogeneities in the ways of participating in the GVCs among different manufacturing sectors (Ye and Voigt, 2014; Aliyrkko and Rouvinen, 2015) . In this paper, Koopman's measure will be applied to estimate the positions of China's manufacturing and its subsectors in GVCs.
Methods and Data

Methods
In this paper, China's manufacturing position in GVCs is compared with those of other countries. For this purpose, Koopman's measures are applied in this paper to give an estimate on China's manufacturing's position in global value chains. Koopman decomposed the gross export of a country into 5 different value added components, as table 2 suggests. used by the direct importer to produce its domestically needed products（II） used by the direct importer to produce goods for third countries ("indirect value added exports')（III） used by the direct importer to produce goods shipped back to source ("reflected domestic value added")（IV） Value-added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports ("foreign value added used in exports").（V） Note: compiled according to related literature (Koopman and Powers et al., 2010).
Based on above decomposition of trade value added, quantitative indexes are constructed to assess whether a particular sector in a country is likely located in the upstream or downstream of the global production chain. These indexes are GVC position index and GVC participation index, which are defined as follows.
From the above formulas, i denotes sectors in manufacturing, r denotes the country in question. The IV is the indirect value added exports, that is, domestic value-added embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct importer to produce goods for third countries and FV represents the foreign value added used in exports, the value-added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports.
If the sector of a country lies upstream in a chain, its GVC position index tends to be larger. On the other hand, if it locates downstream, this index will show a relatively low value. The GVC participation index is used, together with the position index, to show the importance of global value chain for a specific sector or industry in a country.
Data
The data on value-added trade that are used to calculate the above indexes are obtained from the 
China's manufacturing export in the world
In table 3 we list the export trade values of manufacturing in 10 selected countries in 2014, to show the importance of those countries' manufacturing in the world. In these countries there are top five countries from developed world, i.e., the Europe Union, Germany, the United States, Japan and Korea, and top five developing countries, i.e., China, Mexico, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, in term of export value of manufacturing in 2014.
We can see from table 3 below that China's manufacturing holds a significant role in the global market in term of trade. China exceeded any other single country, even the developed country, except for EU, in the world by a large margin in manufacturing gross export value in 2014, which help establish its repute as the "biggest manufacturing" country in the world. Does this, however, necessarily mean that China's manufacturing is now in a very good shape, in view of the greater share of gross export value for China's manufacturing in the world, therefore China is proceeding on its way to enjoy high productivity and leading role in world manufacturing? The answer needs more detailed analysis.
China's Manufacturing's Position Index in GVCs
Values in table 4 give the position index of those countries' manufacturing over recent decades. From the table we are advised that most of the developed countries positioned their manufacturing in upstream stages of GVCs, while developing countries lied downstream relatively. This means that in global value chain a larger proportion of components and intermediates traded are produced in developed countries, then exported to, and assembled into complete products in developing countries, than vice versa. Among those countries the European Union take a lead by keeping the highest GVC position index. In contrary, Korea's manufacturing is experiencing descending trend of its position in GVCs.
China's manufacturing, being the lowest in GVC position index from 1995 to 2005, is steadily climbing up to around 6 th among the 10 selected countries, most probably thanks to its accession to WTO since 2001.
China's Manufacturing's Participation Index in GVCs
The values in table 5 indicate the level of importance for GVCs in a country's manufacturing, as the GVC participation index suggests.
GVC participation indexes tell a different story. For most countries, the developing countries possess much higher participation indexes than the developed, except for EU. EU's indicator is the highest in 10 countries, showing its deep dependencies on GVCs for EU's manufacturing. Nonetheless, Germany, United States, and Japan exhibit relatively low degree of participation in the GVCs. China and Vietnam are the top two developing countries with high participation index only behind EU. 
Conclusions
China's GVC position and participation indexes in conjunction show the whole picture of China's manufacturing's interconnectedness with the rest of the world. Relative low GVC position index for China's manufacturing indicates that it is still locating downstream of the global value chain. In the meanwhile, China's manufacturing has been more than ever deeply inserted into the global production chains.
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of GVC position and participation indexes may have a profound implication for both the policy makers and industry practitioners. Proper measurements are expected to be brought up to keep China's manufacturing from being locked at the low end of GVCs in the near future. The supply-side reforms led by government may help to change this situation.
